The State of Utah v. Tracy Alan Candelario : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1994
The State of Utah v. Tracy Alan Candelario : Reply
Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jan Graham; Attorney General; J. Frederic Voros; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for
Appellee.
David V. Finlayson; Robert K. Heineman; Salt Lake City Defender Ass\'n; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Candelario, No. 940500 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1994).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6149
UTA" 
DC. 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF "THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
TRACY ALAN CANDELARIO, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
DOU 
Case No. 940500-CA 
Priority No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a sentence enhancement imposed pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (1995) upon judgment and conviction for 
one count of robbery, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1995), in the Third Judicial District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Timothy 
R. Hanson, Judge, presiding. 
JAN GRAHAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR. 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Appellee 
DAVID V. FINLAYSON (6540) 
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN (5481) 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASS'N 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
FN Pr I fetal Masam §r - ' 
AUG 3 01995 
^ u r l T OF 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
TRACY ALAN CANDELARIO, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 940500-CA 
Priority No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a sentence enhancement imposed pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (1995) upon judgment and conviction for 
one count of robbery, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1995), in the Third Judicial District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Timothy 
R. Hanson, Judge, presiding. 
JAN GRAHAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR. 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
DAVID V. FINLAYSON (6540) 
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN (5481) 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASS'N 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Attorneys for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. MR. CANDELARIO HAS NOT WAIVED HIS CLAIM THAT 
THE FIREARM ENHANCEMENT DOES NOT APPLY WHERE THERE 
IS ONLY A VERBAL REPRESENTATION OF A FIREARM, 
RATHER THAN A PHYSICAL REPRESENTATION. 
CONCLUSION 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
page 
Broberg v. Hess, 782 P. 2d 198 (Utah App. 1989) 3 
Bundv v. Century Equip. Co. . 692 P.2d 754 (Utah 1984) 3 
Franklin Fin, v. New Empire Dev. Co.. 
659 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1983) 2, 3 
Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1988) 2 
James v. Preston. 746 P.2d 799 (Utah App. 1987) 3 
Lamkin v. Lynch. 600 P.2d 530 (Utah 1979) 3 
State v. Johnson. 856 P.2d 1064 (Utah 1993) 3 
State v. Kazda. 545 P.2d 190 (Utah 1976) 2 
Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management. Inc., 
645 P.2d 667 (Utah 1982) 3 
Utah County v. Brown. 672 P.2d 83 (Utah 1983) 2 
Wurst v. Dep't of Employment Sec. 
818 P. 2d 1036 (Utah App. 1991) 3 
STATUTES. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
U.S. Const, amend. V 1 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1 1 
Utah Const, art. I, § 7 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (1995) 1 
ii 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
TRACY ALAN CANDELARIO, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 940500-CA 
Priority No. 2 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following are set forth in addendum A: 
U.S. Const, amend. V 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1 
Utah Const, art. I, § 7 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (1995) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. MR. CANDELARIO HAS NOT WAIVED HIS CLAIM 
THAT THE FIREARM ENHANCEMENT DOES NOT APPLY 
WHERE THERE IS ONLY A VERBAL REPRESENTATION OF 
A FIREARM, RATHER THAN A PHYSICAL 
REPRESENTATION. 
(Responding to State's brief at Point A., pp. 4-7) 
The State asserts that Mr. Candelario has waived his 
claim as a result of counsel's statement that imposition of the 
enhancement was discretionary, rather than illegal. While 
counsel's articulation may have been inartful, there is no question 
that the trial court understand the thrust of her argument, and 
actually ruled on the applicability of the enhancement. 
The trial court stated: 
THE COURT: Sounds to me like an ideal question 
for one of the appellate courts to consider. I can't see 
a dime's worth of difference if you're the person 
standing there being robbed where a person represents 
they have a firearm, or whether or not it's displayed, 
they believe you, the fear is still there. I suppose 
there's a lot of aggravated robberies that don't result 
in a shooting. We all know how I feel about firearms. 
You use a firearm, you get an enhancement, or if you 
represent you have one. If that's wrong, the appellate 
courts can figure a way to get around the statute. But 
that doesn't change my mind about it. The fact that 
there wasn't one may have some impact on whether or not 
this sentence should run consecutively . . . 
R. 51. 
The issue has been properly preserved. The trial court 
understood that defendant's position was that the enhancement could 
not be based solely on a verbal representation. The trial court 
recognized the issue, noted that it "sounds . . . like an ideal 
question for one of the appellate courts to consider," and ruled 
that the enhancement was in fact applicable based solely on a 
verbal representation. 
The purposes behind the waiver rule are well established: 
The requirement of a specific objection on the record 
ensures that the trial court will understand the basis of 
the objections and have an opportunity to correct any 
errors before the case goes to the jury. E.g. , State v. 
Kazda, 545 P.2d 190, 192-3 (Utah 1976) . This requirement 
also assures that the appellate court will have a record 
of the grounds asserted below. If, however, the record 
on appeal fails to demonstrate that the trial court has 
been given a fair opportunity to avoid an error, we 
usually will not consider any claim based on that error. 
E.g., Franklin Fin, v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659 P.2d 
1040, 1045 (Utah 1983). 
Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 16 (Utah 1988) . 
[I]n order to preserve a plea of error, the alleged error 
must have been raised seasonably by counsel to the trial 
court. The purpose of this rule is to allow the trial 
court to correct any error, if error there be. 
Utah County v. Brown, 672 P.2d 83, 85 (Utah 1983) (footnote 
omitted). 
2 
A timely and recorded objection to the trial 
court's failure to comply with a request at trial puts 
the judge on notice of the asserted error and allows the 
opportunity for correction at that time in the course of 
the proceeding. . . . There is no support for 
appellant's claim that the trial judge knew the action he 
was requested to take but refused to take it. 
Broberg v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198, 201 (Utah App. 1989). 
In Utah, matters not raised in the pleadings nor put in 
issue at the trial may not be raised for the first time 
on appeal. Bundy v. Century Equip. Co., 692 P.2d 754, 
758 (Utah 1984); Franklin Fin, v. New Empire Dev. Co., 
659 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983). A matter is 
sufficiently raised if it has been submitted to the trial 
court and the trial court has had an opportunity to make 
findings of fact or law. See Turtle Management, Inc. v. 
Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 672 (Utah 1982). 
James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah App. 1987) . See also 
State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1067 (Utah 1993) ("A defendant is 
obliged to seek a trial court's ruling on an issue before the issue 
can be raised in an appellate court."); Lamkin v. Lynch, 600 P.2d 
530, 533 (Utah 1979) ("This point is raised for the first time on 
appeal and hence was not ruled upon by the trial court."); Wurst 
v. Dep't of Employment Sec, 818 P.2d 1036, 1039 (Utah App. 1991) 
(issue sufficiently raised where mentioned in letter to department 
which served as appeal of A.L.J.'s decision). 
In this case, the trial court was apprised of the 
asserted error, given an opportunity to rule, and did in fact rule. 
No waiver has occurred. 
Mr. Candelario relies on his opening brief in response to 
the remainder of the State's brief. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Candelario's appeal should be 
addressed on the merits. The consecutive one year firearm 
enhancement portion of his sentence should be vacated. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ day of August, 1995. 
DAVID V. FINLAYSON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
Statutes, rules, and constitutional provisions. 
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
[Criminal actions - Provisions concerning - Due process 
of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a 
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in 
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the 
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public 
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
The fourteenth amendment to the United States 
Constitution, section 1 provides: 
Section 1. [Citizenship -- Due process of law -- Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (1995) provided: 
76-3-203. Felony conviction - Indeterminate term of 
imprisonment - Increase of sentence if 
firearm used. 
A person who has been convicted of a felony may 
be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as 
follows: 
(2) In the case of a felony of the second 
degree, for a term at not less than one year nor 
more than 15 years but if the trier of fact finds a 
firearm or a facsimile or the representation of a 
firearm was used in the commission or furtherance 
of the felony, the court shall additionally 
sentence the person convicted for a term of one 
year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
the court may additionally sentence the person 
convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed 
five years to run consecutively and not 
concurrently; 
